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ABSTRACT 
The taxability of recoveries of damages on account of emotional distress remains a 
complicated issue under the American federal income tax law. Recent developments due to a 
controversial decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have further added fuel to this 
debate. Even if one were to argue the justifications of exempting such recoveries from income 
taxation, courts do not appear to be the very appropriate kind of forum. Congress can, and in fact 
does tax such recoveries and the constitutional basis of such power can hardly be doubted. As a 
result, appropriate changes in the statute only can bring the desirable result of exempting such 
recoveries from income taxation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
The Internal Revenue Code1 (“IRC” or “Code”) is the most voluminous and complex of 
any set of federal statutes in America. It is through these statutes that Congress exercises its 
taxing power.2 There are several different types of taxes covered by these statues,3 one of which 
is federal income tax. Although for the average American income tax may appear as a necessary 
evil, most would agree that the federal government could not function without some type of tax. 
This leads to conflicts between taxpayers and the federal government because the government is 
concerned with collecting revenue and taxpayers are concerned about minimizing their tax 
liability. In the process of finding a common ground, the situation is made more difficult by the 
fact that an economist’s definition of income does not always comport with the Code’s definition 
of income. Thus, Albert Einstein may have been correct in saying that “[T]he hardest thing in the 
world to understand is the income tax.”4  
This paper discusses one such example where a particular taxpayer felt that a certain type 
of award she received as damages for suffering emotional distress ought not to be taxed.5  Her 
                                                 
1 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9833 (2007). 
2 See, e.g., JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
21 (13th ed. 2004). 
3 The Internal Revenue Code is further divided into various subtitles and contains a variety of taxes like Income 
Taxes, Estate and Gift Taxes, Employment Taxes, and Miscellaneous Excise Taxes including Excise Taxes on 
Alcohol and Tobacco. See FREELAND ET. AL., supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing the historical evolution of different 
types of taxes under internal revenue taxation). 
4 See THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC QUOTATIONS 195 (Michael Jackman ed., 1984). 
5 Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, Murphy v. IRS, 
Not reported in F.3d, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (vacating the prior opinion and 
scheduling oral arguments for Apr. 23, 2007) 
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discomfort with the taxing of such a receipt resulted in a protracted litigation that apparently is 
still far from over.6  The problem is that the IRC defines “income” in a wide and expansive 
fashion, allowing exclusions only for certain specifically defined items.  These exclusions are 
matters of legislative privilege and grace and must not be treated as inherently excludible 
because of their character or nature.  The philosophy of the tax Code is that anything that can 
properly fall within the catch-all definition of income is includible, whereas  exclusions are 
defined in a more exclusive and exhaustive manner.  In other words, if a taxpayer forgets or 
chooses to forget to show on a tax return a particular item of income, the taxpayer continues be 
liable regardless. But, no consequences follow if the taxpayer forgets to choose to exclude an 
item to which he or she is entitled to. The taxpayer simply loses the exclusion. The reason is that 
if the taxpayer does not choose to take the benefit of a legislative privilege, no corresponding 
obligation is created on the part of the government. 
 Chapter 2 of this paper gives details of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service,7   a case 
remarkable for the court’s interpretation of what constitutes income. This case was subject to 
much criticism after it initially was decided by the United States Court of Appeals, District of 
Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”).  
                                                 
6 Murphy v. IRS, Not reported in F. 3d, No. 05-5139, 2007 WL 1892238 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2007) (rejecting Ms. 
Murphy’s argument in all respects upon rehearing), see also Jeremia Coder, D.C. Circuit Reverses Course In 
Murphy Redux, TAX NOTES, July 9, 88 (2007) (quoting Ms. Murphy’s Counsel that he will seek further review of 
the case). 
7 460 F. 3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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This case, in fact, became important not only for tax law scholars but also for 
constitutional law scholars.8  The case and the core issues it presents justify a discussion of 
constitutional law, tax law, tort law, and employment law. Chapter 3 discusses the case from 
these four perspectives. 
Chapter 4 provides a general critique of the pre-rehearing and the reversal of the Murphy 
decision.  The paper concludes with Chapter 5, containing recommendations for statutory 
changes in the tax Code for exempting income tax on damages received on account of emotional 
distress to the victims under whistle-blower protection statutes. 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, This One’s is for the Tax Nuts,  http:// www. professorbainbridge .com/2006/08/this 
_ones_for_t.html (last visited June 25, 2007); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Tax Law Ruling by Court May Encourage New 
Challenges, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=azSs FNBVDjJ8& refer =us (last visited 
June 25, 2007); Tax Prof Commentary after Murphy (2006), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2 
006/08/ tax_ prof_ comment.html (giving a critique of Murphy decision by law professors) (last visited June 25, 
2007). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Background  
 
 
A. The Genesis of Murphy 
 
In Murphy, the taxpayer, Ms. Marrita Murphy, sued her former employer, the New York 
Air National Guard, for emotional distress and loss of reputation.9 She alleged that her employer 
both blacklisted her and gave her negative references after she disclosed environmental hazards 
at the air base. She brought suit under the whistleblower provisions of the environmental 
statutes.10 At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Ms. Murphy submitted 
evidence that she had suffered both mental and physical injuries as a result of her employer’s 
wrongful actions.11 She introduced testimony from a physician who stated that she had suffered 
both “somatic” and “emotional” injuries.12 Upon evidence of other physical manifestations of 
such injuries, the ALJ awarded Ms Murphy $45,000 for emotional distress and $25,000 for 
injury to her professional reputation.13 Ms. Murphy paid the requisite federal income tax on the 
award and thereafter filed a claim for refund in the federal district court14, after her refund claim 
                                                 
9 Murphy, 460 F. 3d at 81. 
10 Id. 
11Id. 
12 Id. The word “somatic” means – “Corporeal; pertaining to the body as distinct from the soul, mind or psyche,” see 
WEBSTER’S  NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1729 (2d ed. 1967). 
13 Murphy, 460 F. 3d at 81. 
14 The U.S. district courts have refund jurisdiction on internal-revenue tax matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) 
(providing that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action for the recovery of tax that was 
assessed or collected erroneously); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (providing that no suit for a claim of refund shall be 
filed in any court until a claim has been administratively decided); see generally CAMILLA E. WATSON, TAX 
PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD IN A NUT SHELL (3d ed. 2006). 
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was denied by the Internal Revenue Service15 (IRS). She lost the case and then appealed to the 
D.C. Circuit.16 
Section 61 of the IRC defines “gross income” in a very broad manner.17 Section 
104(a)(2) 18 provides that “gross income”  does not include the amount of any damages (other 
than punitive damages) received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.19 
Since 199620 it has further provided that, for purposes of this exclusion, “emotional distress shall 
not be treated as physical injury or physical sickness.”21  
 
B. The Arguments Advanced by Ms. Murphy  
     
1. The “Physical Injury” Argument 
 
Ms. Murphy first argued that her award was in fact for “personal physical injury” under 
Section 104(a)(2) and thus should be excludable from her gross income. In support of this 
argument, she primarily pointed to her physician’s testimony that she had, in fact, suffered a 
physical injury. She also relied upon her dental records, submitted to the IRS, to show that she 
had suffered permanent damage to her teeth.22 She contended that she suffered substantial 
physical problems that were caused by emotional distress that arose, in turn, from her employer’s 
                                                 
15 The IRS may assert a tax deficiency on a taxpayer in certain cases. In such situations, the taxpayer may contest 
and the judicial remedy is not limited to suit in the Tax Court. The taxpayer can pay the deficiency and then file an 
administrative claim for refund. Upon denial, the taxpayer can file suit in the District Court for a refund. Unlike Tax 
Court, if a refund claim is heard by a District Court then the fact issues may be determined by a jury if the taxpayer 
demands a jury trial. See  supra note 14. 
16 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 82. 
17 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2007). 
18 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2007). 
19  Id. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 224-235. 
21 26 U.S.C § 104(a)(2) (2007). 
22 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 83. 
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wrongful conduct and that these physical manifestations must be considered physical injuries or 
physical sickness.23 
 
2. The “Sixteenth Amendment” “Income” Argument 
 
Ms. Murphy’s second argument, a novel one, was much more interesting. This one was 
based on the definition of income at the time of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment24 to 
the U.S. Constitution. She focused upon three sources,25 all of which the U.S. Supreme Court 
had quoted in O’Gilvie v. United States:26  an opinion of the U.S. Attorney General,27 a decision 
of the Treasury Department,28 and a report issued by the Ways and Means Committee of the 
House of Representatives.29 In O’Gilivie, the Court had analyzed the 1918 exclusionary 
provision and commented that the language excluded from income those damages that are a 
substitution for a victim’s physical or personal well being.30 Relying on this, Ms. Murphy 
maintained that the predecessor of Section 104(a)(2) more accurately reflected the meaning of 
the Sixteenth Amendment as understood by those who framed, adopted, and ratified it because 
the statute was enacted soon after the ratification of the Amendment. Ms. Murphy also relied on 
Dotson v. United States,31 a Fifth Circuit decision in which the court examined the legislative 
history of Section 104(a)(2) and concluded that “Congress first enacted the personal injury 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, see also infra text accompanying notes 130-151. 
25 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85. 
26 519 U.S.79 (1996). 
27 See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918) (expressing that accident insurance proceeds substitute human capital 
which is the source of future periodical incomes). 
28 See T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) (holding that an amount received by an individual as the result 
of a suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained in an accident is not income). 
29 See H.R. REP. No. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918) (stating that under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts 
received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal 
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross 
income). 
30 O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86 (1996). 
31 87 F.3d 682 ( 5th Cir. 1996). 
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compensation exclusion at a time when such payments were considered a return of human 
capital, and thus not constitutionally taxable “income” under the 16th Amendment.”32  
 
C. The Counter Arguments  
 
The IRS attacked Ms. Murphy’s arguments on every front and also invoked the general 
presumption that Congress enacts laws within its constitutional limits.33 It noted that Congress 
could repeal Section 104(a)(2), if it so chose thereby taxing compensation for both physical and 
nonphysical injuries within the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment.34 The IRS took 
exception to Murphy’s “human capital” argument, pointing that a human has no basis or cost, 
nor is it subject to depreciation, in contrast to true returns of capital in the tax sense.35 
 
D. The Opinion of the D. C. Court of Appeals  
 
The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected Ms. Murphy’s first argument. Analyzing the ALJ’s 
proposed award, it noted that the damages were awarded because of Ms. Murphy’s nonphysical 
injuries.36 Relying on O’Gilvie, the court concluded that the compensation was not paid “on 
account of” personal physical injury and thus was not entitled to the benefit of Section 104(a)(2). 
Nonetheless, the court agreed with Ms. Murphy’s second argument, relying on the rationale of 
O’Gilvie to determine whether the compensatory damages awarded were a substitute for a 
normally untaxed personal quality, good, or asset.37 The Murphy court also relied on an Opinion 
issued in 1922 by the IRS.38 According to this Opinion, defamation was akin to invasion of a 
personal right and since this right was not transferable, there could be no correct estimate of the 
                                                 
32 Id. at  685, see also Susan Kalinka, Murphy: Is Code Sec 104(a)(2) Constitutional?, TAXES-THE TAX MAGAZINE, 
Nov. 2006, at 7. 
33 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84, 86-87. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Murphy,460 F.3d at 84. 
37 Murphy,460 F.3d at 85. 
38 See Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CB 92, 93-94 (1922). 
 8
money value of the invaded right. On this reasoning, the Opinion held that damages received for 
invasion of such a right did not result in any gain or profit that could be taxed.39 The court then 
concluded that if the award was “in lieu” of something normally untaxed, as had been the case 
with other awards similar to that of Ms. Murphy’s, then the award was not within the meaning of 
the Sixteenth Amendment and was not subject to tax.40 Therefore, the court remanded the case to 
the district court for an order entering judgment in favor of Ms. Murphy. 
The Murphy judgment came under sharp criticism from various quarters.41 Apparently in 
response to that criticism, the DC circuit vacated its earlier judgment and decided to rehear the 
matter en banc.42 Upon rehearing, the court rejected all the arguments of Ms. Murphy and 
affirmed the judgment of the district court.43 It is not clear whether the taxpayer will appeal to 
the Supreme Court or whether on appeal the Court will agree to hear the matter. In spite of this, 
it is clear that Murphy revived an old debate that is better understood after a discussion of a few 
related perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 89. 
41 See supra note 8. 
42 Murphy v. IRS, Not reported in F. 3d, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). 
43 Murphy v. IRS, Not reported in F. 3d, No. 05-5139, 2007 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir.  July 3, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Discussion 
 
A. The Constitutional Law Perspective 
The United States Constitution is the fundamental source of all laws enacted by 
Congress. Thus, Congress’s lawmaking power cannot exceed constitutional limits.44  For an 
understanding of such an expansive, yet not unlimited, power and a proper contextualization of 
the Murphy case, it is imperative to understand the gradual evolution of the congressional power 
to tax.  
 
1. A Brief History of the Taxing Power of Congress 
Beginning 1781, the Articles of Confederation, or the first American constitution, gave 
birth to the idea of fiscal powers to the United States.45  This was important since, according to 
one leading commentator, taxation was at the very center of popular consciousness and the break 
with Britain was motivated largely by this issue.46 However, on closer scrutiny it would appear 
                                                 
44 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (holding that every law enacted by Congress must be 
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution). 
45 See Articles of Confederation, art. VIII (1781) which provided that “ All charges of war, and all other expenses 
that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress 
assembled shall be defrayed out of common treasury which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to 
the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed on any person, as such land and the buildings and the 
improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall 
from time to time direct and appoint.  The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid in levied by the authority and 
direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress 
assembled.” See also Articles of Confederation, art. II (1781) which showed signs of weakness of the then Congress 
by reading that “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and 
right, which is not by the confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” 
46 See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7(1999) (discussing the origins of 
the constitutional underpinnings of the congressional power to tax). 
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that the Articles of Confederation did not provide the federal government with any real or 
enforceable power to tax. Thus the Government had to rely on the good will of its citizens to 
obtain the funds necessary to fulfill its obligations and basic functions.47 This soon led to 
dissatisfaction among the federalists, for the taxing scheme provided the Continental Congress 
with the power to requisition the states for revenue but there was no mechanism to enforce the 
corresponding obligation upon them. The federalists indeed wanted a Constitution that would 
give a nearly unlimited taxing power to the central government.48 According to Alexander 
Hamilton, for example, taxing power was one of the necessary powers for an energetic 
government.49 He argued that the resources of the community, and not the Constitution, should 
limit the taxing power.50 Anti-federalists, on the other hand, fearfully argued that the Congress 
could use taxation to turn a federation into a consolidated government drawing all other powers 
as a corollary to taxing power.51 After a near tug-of-war, the federalists eventually prevailed and 
their victory sign was codified as following: 
Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises. . .52 
                                                 
47 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. 
L. REV. 1, 21 (1992) (observing that the government could not long survive under these conditions and thus the 
Constitution remedied this problem by giving Congress the power to tax). 
48 See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Unconstitutional?, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2346 (1997). 
49 Id. n.61 (“[T]hey ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and 
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to 
satisfy them.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). 
50 Id. n.62 (“Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its 
life and motion and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a 
regular and adequate supply of revenue, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an 
indispensable ingredient in every constitution.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).  
51 See Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the Articles of Confederation into the 
Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 509 nn. 222- 223 (2003-2004). 
52 U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 1. It is interesting to note, however, that neither the Articles of Confederation nor the 
Federal Constitution provided any justification for such taxing power. Contrast this with the Pennsylvania 
Constitution which in 1776 declared “[T]hat every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment 
of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that 
protection;” and the Rhode Island Constitution which in 1842 expressed: “[T]he burdens of the State ought to be 
 11
This clause consistently has been construed to mean that Congress’s taxing power is “plenary.” 53  
Supreme judicial affirmation of such a congressional prowess was heard as early as 1796. In 
Hylton v. United States54, when the Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of taxing 
power,55 Justice Paterson wrote in his concurring opinion that “[I]t was, however, obviously the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that Congress should possess full power over every 
species of taxable property, except exports. The term taxes, is generical, and was used to vest in 
Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation.”56 In a long string of cases since then, the 
Supreme Court has affirmed this broad taxing power of the Congress in myriad ways. For 
example, in McCulloch v. Maryland,57 Chief Justice Marshall owed the origin of power of 
taxation to the sovereign power of the national government by saying that “But, taxation is said 
to be an absolute power which acknowledges no other limits than those expressly prescribed in 
the constitution...”58 Later, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,59 Chief Justice Chase wrote that the very 
purpose behind giving broad taxing powers to Congress was apparent from the terms used in the 
Constitution and that “[M]ore comprehensive words could not have been used. . .”60  In Stanton 
v. Baltic Mining Co.,61 the Court gave more than a reaffirmation to its earlier stance: “. . . [T]he 
                                                                                                                                                             
fairly distributed among its citizens.” See, e.g., William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional 
Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 9 (2006). 
53 See, e.g., LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917, at 154 (Henry S. 
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1971) (describing clause as so sweeping that it has seldom been construed as 
an interference with any tax measure”), quoted in  Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment and 
the Meaning of “Incomes”, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1059 n.2 (2001) (continuing challenge to the notion that the 
taxing power is plenary and in the process, assigning meaning to the term “plenary” as “without significant 
restriction”). 
54 3 U.S. 171 (1796). 
55 See Jensen  supra note 48, at id. 
56 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 176. 
57 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
58 Id. at 427. 
59 75 U.S. 533, 540 (1869). 
60 Id. 
61 240 U.S. 103, 112 (1912). 
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previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress. . . ”62  The 
same year, the Court in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.63 held that the taxing authority of 
Congress was “an authority already possessed and never questioned,”64 and that even the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment65 did not impair this power.66  Further, in Penn Mut. 
Indem. Co. v. Commissioner,67 it was held that “[I]t did not take a constitutional amendment to 
entitle the United States to impose an income tax.”68  More recently, in United States v. 
Ptaynski,69 it was recognized that the “power to tax is virtually without limitation.”70  
 
2. Constitutional Limitations on Taxing Power and the Sixteenth 
Amendment 
From the foregoing discussion, it appears clear that Article I, Section 8, clause 1 of the 
Constitution gives Congress wide and expansive power to tax. If no other constitutional 
provision affected the taxing power, this would clearly be enough to authorize the imposition of 
an income tax. However, Section 2, clause 3 and Section 9, clause 4 of Article I require that 
“direct” taxes be apportioned among the several states in accordance with their respective 
populations.71 Further, Article I, Section 8, clause 1 reads: “all duties, imposts and excises shall 
be uniform throughout the Unites States.”72  
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 240 U.S. 1 (1916). 
64 Id. at 17-18. 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
66 240 U.S. at 18. 
67 277 F.2d 16 (1960). 
68 Id. at 19. 
69 462 U.S.74 (1983). 
70 Id. at 79. 
71 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
72 See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 2 at 15 (quoting Justice Chase: “[T]he power of Congress to tax is very 
extensive power. It is given in the Constitution with only . . . two qualifications. Congress must impose direct taxes 
by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.”). 
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Thus, each and every tax law that seeks to tax income must conform to the dual 
requirements of “apportionment” (if the tax is a “direct” tax) and “uniformity.” However, it is 
important not to lose sight of the Sixteenth Amendment for a proper understanding of income 
tax. 
 
(a) The “Apportionment” Requirement for “Direct” Taxes  
The Constitution contains no definition of what constitutes direct taxes. It only requires 
that they be apportioned among the several states. In the absence of an express definition of the 
term, it would be worthwhile to consider the period of history in which arose. In the original 
Constitutional debate, the Founders usually used the term as synonymous with “internal taxes,” 
meaning all taxes except taxes on imports or exports.73  The reasons behind including a direct tax 
clause are debatable but they point to two broad sources of their origin. First, and the more 
obvious source, is the Federalists’ fight over a taxing regime that would allow them to 
circumvent the states and tax their subjects directly.74 Such was the importance of their 
insistence that the very existence of the Constitution is owed to a great extent to the Federalists’ 
desire to have supreme authority to tax.75  Another source, which is less obvious, is the North-
South tension that prevailed at that point of time over the issue of slavery.76  Thus, it was more 
likely the pragmatism of the Founders rather than the actual concrete meaning of the term “direct 
taxes” that led to its inclusion in the Constitution.77 It was a coincidence that Hylton again was 
                                                 
73 See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6-7 (1998) (giving an example to show both the necessity and absurdity of apportionment). 
74 See Jensen, supra note 52, at 1068 (showing that the Articles of Confederation had been a fiscal disaster with the 
purportedly “national” government's having absolutely no taxing power over individual citizens). 
75 See Johnson, supra note 73, at 21 (terming the Constitution as a pro-tax revolt). 
76 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 177; see also Ackerman, supra note 45, at 7-10.  
77 See Johnson, supra note 73, at 76 (attributing the definition of direct taxes and decision on apportionment to the 
pragmatism of the Founders). 
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the first case in which the Supreme Court pondered the meaning of the term direct taxes.78 
Justice Chase wrote: “I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the 
direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, 
simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on LAND. -
- I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is 
included within the term direct tax.”79  Justice Paterson conveyed the same idea: “Whether direct 
taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and tax on 
land, is a questionable point.”80 After the civil war, the Supreme Court discussed this 
fundamental issue in five cases.81 In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule,82 the Court followed Hylton 
in holding that only direct taxes are those that could be easily and fairly apportioned. In the next 
case, Veazie Bank v. Fenno,83 the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a ten-percent tax 
on currency issued by state banks. Upon a review of the historical evidence, the Court arrived at 
the conclusion that personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, had never been 
regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct tax.84  The Court, while affirming that direct 
taxes were limited to taxes on land and appurtenances, and taxes on polls, or capitation taxes, 
                                                 
78 This case presented a precise question whether a duty upon a article of personal property kept solely for the 
enjoyment of its owner was or was not a direct tax. Representing the defendant in error, Alexander Hamilton argued 
that “direct and indirect tax had no settled meanings; that by test of shiftablness this tax would be part direct and part 
indirect, which would be absurd; that by the prevailing political economy taxes upon land are called direct and all 
others indirect, because “all taxes fall ultimately upon land, and are paid out of its produce, whether laid 
immediately upon itself, or upon any other thing”; that a rule must be adopted which would not involve 
“preposterous consequences”; that this tax would in the British statutes be an excise; and that “where so important a 
distinction in the Constitution is to be realized, it is fair to see the meanings of terms in the statutory language of that 
country from which our jurisprudence is derived;” See Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 
20 HARV. L. REV. 280, 283 (1906-1907). 
79 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174. 
80 Id. at 177. 
81 See Whitney, supra note 78, at id. n.1; see Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433 (1868); Farmington v. 
Saunders (the cotton tax case, affirmed by a divided court without opinion); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 U.S. 533 
(1870); Scholey v. Rew, 23 U.S. 331 (1874); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
82 74 U.S.  433,  446 (1868). 
83 8 U.S. 533 (1870). 
84 Id. at 543. 
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held that tax on bank notes was in the nature of a duty and thus was constitutional.85  Again, in 
Scholey v. Rew,86 the Supreme Court upheld a Civil War Succession tax on real estate received 
under a will.87 Lastly, in Springer v. United States,88 the Civil War income tax was challenged on 
the ground that it was a direct tax requiring apportionment. The taxpayer in Springer filed an 
income tax return, but refused to pay the assessed tax. The tax collector therefore levied on the 
taxpayer’s real estate, purchased the property at a tax lien sale, and sought to eject the taxpayer 
from the premises. The taxpayer then challenged the tax assessment, levy, sale, and ejectment on 
due process and apportionment grounds. Once again, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
the tax from constitutional challenge, relying on the lack of clarity from the constitutional 
debates, the notes left behind by Alexander Hamilton from the Hylton case, the letters of James 
Madison disagreeing with the Hylton case (but recognizing that the courts were unlikely to adopt 
his views), the prior practice of Congress in imposing taxes, and the recent decisions in Veazie, 
Soule and Scholey. The Court concluded: “. . . that direct taxes, within the meaning of the 
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; 
and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or 
duty.”89  
This unbroken chain of reasoning continued well past the Nineteenth century until the 
Income Tax Cases (Pollock I & Pollock II)90 in 1895 when the Supreme Court briefly revived the 
                                                 
85 Id. at 546-547. 
86 90 U.S. 331 (1875). 
87 Scholey, 90 U.S. at 347-48 (holding that direct does not include tax on income and a succession tax in principle is 
similar to  income tax). 
88 102 U.S. 586 (1881). 
89 Id. at 599-602; see also Gergory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of Murphy 
v. Internal Revenue Service, at 29, available at  http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1867/ (last visited June 25, 
2007). 
90 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. 
(Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
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dormant direct tax clause.91 The genesis of the Income Tax Cases was the Tariff Act of 1894,92 
the first non-war income tax enacted by Congress.93 Charles Pollock, a shareholder in the 
Farmers Loan and Trust Company, sued the company to prevent it from paying taxes imposed 
under the 1894 Act on the income generated by the real and personal property that the 
corporation owned. Mr. Pollock claimed that Congress could not constitutionally tax the 
corporation’s income from real and personal property without apportionment.94 The Court 
concluded that the 1894 income tax, which because of a $4000 exemption amount, affected only 
a few taxpayers in a few states, was a direct tax that had not been apportioned.95 The Court 
departed from a century long tradition of Veazie, Soule and Scholey and held that apportionment 
was intended to have real effect.96 The decisions in the Income Tax Cases97 were not comfortable 
ones for the Supreme Court and it took two sets of hearings and opinions for the Court to strike 
down the entire taxing statute. On neither occasion was the Court unanimous.98  Pollock I 
invalidated the income tax only insofar it was imposed on income from real property.99 The 
Court accepted the Hylton dicta that a tax on real estate is a direct tax and saw no constitutionally 
significant difference between a tax on real estate and a tax on income from real estate.100  In the 
opinion of Chief Justice Fuller, indirect taxes were paid by persons who either could shift the 
burden on someone else or were under no legal compulsion to pay. Direct taxes, on the other 
hand, were taxes upon property holders in respect of their real or personal property, or upon 
income derived from such property in a way that the payment of tax could not be avoided by the 
                                                 
91 See Jensen, supra note 53, at 1070. 
92 28 Stat. 509,553 (1894). 
93 See Germain, supra note 89, at 29. 
94 Id. 
95 See Jensen, supra note 53, at 1070-1071. 
96Id. 
97 See Pollock I and Pollock II, supra note 90. 
98 See Jensen, supra note 53, at 1071. 
99 Pollock I ,157 U.S. at 558. 
100 Id. 
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property holders.101  Because it dealt only with income from real property, Pollock I left the 
status of a large part of the Tariff Act of 1894 unclear, and the Court was pressured to rehear the 
case.102  In Pollock II, heard several months later, the Court held that income form personal 
property should be treated the same as income from real property. 103  With income from 
property removed from the base of an unapportioned tax, and because the high exemption 
amount effectively exempted the ordinary services-provider from the scope of the law, the Tariff 
Act of 1894 was gutted in entirety.104 
The negative political reaction to the split decision in Pollock I and Pollock II led quickly 
to some judicial fine tuning and readjustments.105 On a theory different from Pollock I & II,106 
the Supreme Court in Knowlton v. Moore107 unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the War 
Revenue Act of 1898108 which imposed an apportioned tax with progressive rates on legatees 
who received property from a deceased person’s estate. Again, in Thomas v. United States,109 the 
Court deviated from Pollock I & II by holding that a tax on a transfer of stock certificates was 
direct.110 The very same year, the Court in Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. Mcclain111 upheld a 
tax on the gross proceeds from the sale of sugar. The Court held that the tax was not imposed 
upon gross annual receipts as property, but only on the carrying on  the trade or business of 
refining sugar.112  An array of cases decided afterward signaled that the tide of Pollock I &II was 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 See Jensen, supra note 53, at 1071. 
103 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 618.  
104 See Jensen, supra note 53, at id. 
105 See Germain, supra note, 89 at 33. 
106 Id. 
107 178 U.S. 41, 47 (1900).  
108 20 Stat. 448 (1898). 
109 192 U.S. 363 (1904). 
110 Id. at 370. 
111 192 U.S. 397 (1904).  
112 Id. at 411. 
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receding fast.113 However, Congress wanted to throw the Pollock twins into complete oblivion 
by enacting a broad-based income tax.114  President Taft proposed a compromise in the form of a 
constitutional amendment which was to become reality soon in the form of the Sixteenth 
Amendment (discussed infra). After this amendment, the law seems settled and at least the 
Supreme Court does not appear to revert back to the rationale of Pollock I & II, for that would 
mean declaring the Sixteenth Amendment itself unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the burden of 
having provisions relating to apportionment of direct taxes in the Constitution will continue to 
haunt American jurisprudence.115  For example, in Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co.,116 the 
Court held that “[I]f the statute lays taxes on the part of the building occupied by the owner or 
upon the rental value of that space, it can not be sustained, for that would be to lay a direct tax 
requiring apportionment.”117  As one commentator summed up: “[W]e must not forget that as 
long as the words ‘direct taxation’ are retained in the constitution, difficulties in interpretation 
will arise in future, even if the income tax matter is disposed of.”118  
 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracey Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (challenging an excise tax upon the privilege of 
doing business in a corporate capacity) (“Within the category of indirect taxation, as we shall have further occasion 
to show, is embraced a tax upon business done in a corporate capacity, which is the subject-matter of the tax 
imposed in the act under consideration. The Pollock Case construed the tax there levied as direct, because it was 
imposed upon property simply because of its ownership. In the present case the tax is not payable unless there be a 
carrying on or doing of business in the designated capacity, and this is made the occasion for the tax, measured by 
the standard prescribed. The difference between the acts is not merely nominal, but rests upon substantial 
differences between the mere ownership of property and the actual doing of business in a certain way.”); Zonne v. 
Minneapolis Syndicate, 220 U.S. 187, 190 (1911) (corporation challenging its taxability under the Corporate Tax 
Law of 1909) (“[T]he Corporation Tax Law . . . provides for an excise upon the carrying on or doing of business in a 
corporate capacity. We have held in the preceding cases that corporations organized for profit under the laws of the 
State, authorized to manage and rent real estate, and being so engaged, are doing business within the meaning of the 
law, and are therefore liable to the tax imposed.”) (citation omitted); Stratton’s Independence , Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 
U.S. 399, 415 (1913) (plaintiff challenging the applicability of the Corporation Tax Law as the plaintiff was merely 
converting its capital asset from one form to another) (. . .“[F]or “income” may be defined as the gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined, and here we have combined operations of capital and labor.”). 
114 See Germain, supra note 89, at 38. 
115 See, e.g. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 17. 
116 292 U.S. 371 (1934). 
117 Id.  at 378. 
118 See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME 
TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 594 (1911) quoted in Erik M. Jesnesn supra note 53, at 1061-1062. 
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(b) The Requirement of “Uniformity” 
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution provides for two important limitations on the 
taxing power of Congress. While the first relates to apportionment of direct taxes, the second 
limitation relates to the uniformity of “. . .[A]ll duties, imposts, and excises…throughout the 
United States.”119  According to noted Professor Boris Bittker, the uniformity clause is “a 
constitutional provision that might have dramatically influenced the structure of the federal 
income tax, but that has shriveled away to a mere flyspeck.”120  To prove this point, he takes us 
back in history to Pollock I, when it was argued that the 1894 federal income tax violated the 
uniformity clause by taxing some corporate income at a higher rate than individual or partnership 
income “from precisely similar property or business” and by exempting the first $4,000 of 
individual income from salaries and wages while taxing investment income regardless of 
amount.121  The justices were equally divided on the validity of these constitutional objections, 
but the uniformity clause issue got watered down in Pollock II when on rehearing, the Court held 
that the tax violated the direct tax clause because it was not apportioned among the states 
according to population.122  According to Professor Bittker, a liberal interpretation of the 
uniformity clause could have made exemptions and differential tax rates unconstitutional, plus it 
could have invalidated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income.123  The 
Supreme Court had perhaps heard the issue for the first time (even earlier than Pollock I) in 
United States v. Singer.124  However, it is Knowlton v. Moore125 that is generally credited with 
                                                 
119 U.S. CONST art. I. 
120 See Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 9-10 
(1987). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 82 U.S. 111, 121 (1872) (holding tax imposed upon a distiller in the nature of excise, and uniform in its operation 
since it was assessed equally upon all manufacturers of spirits wherever they were). 
125 178 U.S 41 (1900). 
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settling the law that the Constitution requires only geographical uniformity.126  Rejecting the 
construction that the term uniformity related to the inherent and intrinsic character of tax, Justice 
White wrote: “That the words “uniform throughout the United States” do not relate to the 
inherent character of the tax as respects its operation on individuals, but simply requires that 
whatever plan or method Congress adopts for laying the tax in question, the same plan and the 
same method must be made operative throughout the United States; that is to say, that wherever 
a subject is taxed anywhere, the same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United States, 
and at the same rate.”127 
From the foregoing analysis, it appears clear that there are hardly any significant 
impediments to the taxing power of Congress. The principal message is that most taxing statutes 
are not vulnerable to constitutional attack.128 Thus, it is the practicality, and not the 
constitutionality of a tax that is paramount.129 
 
(c) The Sixteenth Amendment and the Present Day Conception of Income. 
In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment eliminated any remaining constitutional requirement 
that taxes on income be apportioned. It provided: 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.130 
                                                 
126 Id. at 106 (analyzing the  history of the adoption of the Constitution and holding that the words “uniform 
throughout the United States” do not signify an intrinsic but simply a geographical uniformity). 
127 Id. at 84; see also Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (“The tax is uniform when it operates with the 
same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”); Nicole v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 521 (1898) 
(“Whether the word "uniform" is to be understood in what has been termed its "geographical" sense, or as meaning 
uniformity as to all the taxpayers similarly situated with regard to the subject-matter of the tax, we think this tax is 
valid . . .”). 
128 See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 20. 
129 Nicole v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515-516 (1899) (“Taxation is eminently practical, and is in fact brought to every 
man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results, 
rather than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute and 
contradiction among those who are experts in the science of political economy.”). 
130 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, see also Germain, supra note 89, at 39. 
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In reality, Pollock I & II had sown the seeds of the Sixteenth Amendment by overruling Hylton. 
The original intent was that Congress should have the power to lay taxes without a restraint. 
Pollock I & II went against that intent for reasons personal to the judges and not mandated by 
constitutional policy.131  In the years that followed, debate ensued to provide Congress with a 
necessary basis for a wide-based income tax scheme.132  This resulted into the adoption of the 
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. The effect of the amendment was not to grant Congress the 
power to adopt income taxes for this power already existed by virtue of Article I of the 
Constitution.133  Instead, the amendment simply eliminated the need for apportionment of any 
income taxes that might be viewed as direct taxes. Following adoption of the Amendment, 
Congress quickly imposed a broadly based income tax.134  It is important to note that the 
amendment does not eliminate the apportionment requirement for direct taxes that do not involve 
income.135  However, even after eliminating the difficulties of Pollock I & II, problems remained 
in determining the constitutional meaning of the term “income” since the Sixteenth Amendment 
nowhere defined the term.136  The Supreme Court’s earlier pronouncements interpreted the term 
very strictly, limiting it to its plain or ordinary meaning.137  In the 1918 case of Towne v. 
Eisner,138 the Court considered the question of whether stock dividends, the source of which was 
earnings accumulated before the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment, were income. While 
discussing the constitutional meaning of the word “income,” the Court said “A word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color 
                                                 
131 See Johnson, supra note 73, at 78. 
132 See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort 
Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 732 (1997). 
133 Id.; see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. at 112-13; Brushaber 
v. Union P.R. Co., 240 U.S.  at 11-18. 
134 Tariff Act of October 3, 1913. See Pub. L. No. 63-16, S II, Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166 (1913). 
135 See Hubbard, supra note 132, at id. 
136 See Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 3. 
137 Id. 
138 245 U.S. 418 (1918). 
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and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”139  The value of this 
case at that point of time was that it effectively determined that statutory and constitutional 
definitions of income coincided.140  In another important case of Eisner v. Macomber141 decided 
two years later, the Court was confronted with the question of whether Congress could impose a 
tax on a stock dividend without requiring apportionment among the states. That is, is such a tax a 
“tax on income” (or part of a “tax on income”) exempt from the apportionment requirement that 
otherwise applies to direct taxes?”142  The Court, while discussing at length the meaning of 
income under the Amendment as well as the statute, said that the question as to what constitutes 
income must be decided according to “truth and substance” without regard to “form.”143  The 
Court further said that in order to interpret the Sixteenth Amendment, all that was required was a 
clear definition of the term “income,” as used in common speech.144  Macomber was criticized 
for its narrow definition of income.145  This was evident in Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Smietanka.146 when the Court departed from its own precedent and held that capital gains were 
income in a constitutional sense because to hold otherwise “would, in a large measure, defeat the 
purpose of the [Sixteenth] Amendment.”147  Finally, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.148 
the Court further demolished Macomber by narrowing the holding to its facts and saying: “But it 
was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”149  In this case, the 
                                                 
139 Id. at 425. 
140 See Jensen, supra note 53, at 1134. 
141 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
142 See Jensen, supra note 53, at 1133. 
143 Macomber, 252 U.S. at 193. 
144 Id. 
145 See Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 14-15. 
146 255 U.S. 509 (1921). 
147 Id. at 521; see also Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 15. 
148 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
149 Id. at 431. 
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catch-all language of Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939150 was in dispute. 
Giving full deference to the intent of Congress, the Court decisively held that income may be 
defined as “. . .[U]ndeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers 
have complete dominion.”151 (emphasis added)  
 
3. Constitutionality of Taxing Damages Recoveries on Account of Emotional 
Distress 
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional democracy that lawmakers must derive 
their lawmaking authority from the Constitution. In the present context also, Congress must 
remain within the constitutional limits while attempting to tax recoveries on account of 
emotional distress.152  However, there is a strong presumption that Congressional statutes are 
constitutional and this presumption only should be overcome when Congress clearly exceeds that 
limit.153  It also would be important to look for an express provision in the Constitution to 
determine whether such a lawmaking power had been conferred on Congress or not.154  Also, 
when the constitutionality of a particular law or its provision is in doubt, it has to be shown that 
there is no conceivable constitutional basis for the same.155  From the foregoing discussion, it is 
clear that a tax on recovery on account of emotional distress would be constitutional if two 
conditions are satisfied. First, the tax must not be in the nature of direct tax requiring 
                                                 
150 53 Stat. 9, 53 Stat. 574, 26 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1939) (predecessor of 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1986)). 
151 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. 
152 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803) (holding that the Constitution of the United States establishes 
certain limits not to be transcended by the different departments of the government). 
153 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (stating that due respect for the decisions of a coordinate 
branch of Government demands that a congressional enactment could be invalidated only upon a plain showing that 
Congress had exceeded its constitutional limits). 
154 United States v. Harris 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1883) (holding that every valid act of Congress must find in the 
Constitution some warrant for its passage). 
155 Madden v. Kentucky 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (stating that the burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it). 
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apportionment; and second, the tax must be on a receipt that can properly be qualified as income 
and not merely a return of capital. 
 
(a) Tax on Emotional Distress Recoveries Must Not Be a Direct Tax Requiring 
Apportionment 
As discussed earlier, Congress’s original Article I power gave it the unfettered authority 
to tax duties and excises without apportionment.156  However, the requirement of apportioning 
direct taxes remains, even though most federal taxes in present times are not categorized as direct 
taxes because of difficulties pertaining to the requirement of apportionment, a point discussed 
earlier in this paper.157  In the present context, therefore, it must be determined whether a tax on 
recoveries for emotional distress qualifies as a direct tax requiring apportionment. If the 
recoveries can be attributed properly to a transaction or an activity, then the tax may not be a 
direct tax. For example, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,158 the Supreme Court upheld taxes on gross 
proceeds from the issuance of bank notes. Again, in Scholey v. Rew,159 taxes on gross proceeds 
inherited at death were upheld. Though the facts were different in these cases, one could easily 
see the connecting thread. The tax was not on property per se but on an activity that related to the 
property that generated income. Also, the historical meaning of direct taxes has been very 
specific and narrow.  
 
 
                                                 
156 See Germain, supra note 89, at 42. 
157 See supra note 118. 
158 8 U.S. 533 (1870). 
159 90 U.S. 331 (1875). 
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(b) Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Must be in the Nature of 
Income and Not Merely a Return of Capital 
Though Glenshaw Glass broadly defined income, it could not be said that a recovery of 
any kind could be characterized as income in the constitutional sense. As a general proposition, 
the tax consequences of a recovery of damages can be determined in part, by identifying the 
nature of the injury.160  The question was framed by the First Circuit in Raytheon Production 
Corp. v. Commissioner:161 “In lieu of what were the damages awarded?”162  Thus, if the recovery 
of damages is solely on account of capital, it can not be taxed; otherwise, it would fall within the 
Glenshaw Glass definition of income. In the context of Murphy, one may say that the recovery of 
damages for emotional distress would be tax-exempt only upon a showing that the damages 
were, in fact, a return of emotional capital, if this term could be properly characterized and 
explained. However, individuals are generally not given a basis for their investments in their own 
human capital.163  In summary, one must look at a transaction’s substance, rather than its, in 
determining the appropriate tax treatment of damage recovery.164  
 
B. The Tax Law Perspective  
Section 61 of the Code defines income in a broadly inclusive and non-exhaustive 
manner.165  Exclusions, on the other hand, are limited and strictly defined. Thus, post Glenshaw 
Glass, almost any kind of receipt or gain would fall within the ambit of statutory definition of 
income but the exclusionary provision has to be expressly found within the Code. 
                                                 
160 United States v Burke, 504 US 229 (1992). 
161 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.1944). 
162 Id. 
163 See Germain, supra note 89, at 76. 
164 See FREELAND ET. AL., supra note 2, at 185 (emphasis in original). 
165 26 U.S.C. § 61. 
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1.   Exclusion for Personal Injury  
The roots of the present day Code go back to 1913, but at that time there was no 
exclusion for personal injury.166  In 1915, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision 
2135.167  It stated that monies received by a taxpayer under an accident insurance policy were 
income, and that an amount received as a result of suit or compromise for “pain and suffering” 
would be treated as income. Although the Treasury Decision 2135 did not specifically deal with 
treatment of damages for personal injury, its wording was sufficiently clear to hold all damages 
for personal injury, compensatory as well as punitive, taxable.168  A change occurred in 1918, 
however, when the Attorney General, responding to a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury 
seeking an opinion on the taxation of accident insurance proceeds, urged Treasury to find ways 
in which such amount could be excludable from income.169  Though the Attorney General’s 
reasoning later was subject to criticism,170 it was accepted and Congress codified the exclusion 
when it added Section 213(b)(6) to the Code.171  The new statute provided that income did not 
include “[A]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's 
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any 
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.”172  In 
1927, the Board of Tax Appeals173 held in Hawkins v. Commissioner,174 that general or 
                                                 
166 Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
167 T. D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915) quoted in Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: 
Congress Gets Physical But Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 56-57 (1997). 
168 Id. 
169 See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304 (1918). 
170 See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 167, at 57-64. 
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independent administrative agency in the executive branch of the government. Its name was changed in 1942 and 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 gave it the status as an Article I Court. See FREEELAND ET. AL. supra note 2, at 29. 
 27
compensatory damages received by way of settlement for injury to personal reputation and 
health caused by defamatory statements constituting libel or slander are not income. The Board 
noted: “Even to the economist, character or reputation or other strictly personal attributes are not 
capital or otherwise measurable in terms of wealth, notwithstanding that all will recognize them 
as important factors of economic success. They are not property or goods. Such compensation as 
general damages adds nothing to the individual, for the very concept which sanctions it prohibits 
that it shall include a profit. It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole as before the injury.”175 
A turning point came in 1955 when, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court rendered its landmark 
decision in Glenshaw Glass, which had important implications for personal injury exclusion 
analysis, both physical and nonphysical.176  The Court sanctioned the human capital rationale177 
for excluding personal injury recoveries.178   It is interesting to note though that the IRS did not 
use Glenshaw Glass to eliminate the nonstatutory exclusion. Instead this decision was used as a 
tool to tax punitive damages.179  Then, in Seay v. Commissioner,180 the Tax Court had an 
opportunity, for the first time, to address the application of the statutory exclusion to nonphysical 
injuries.181  The Tax Court said: “Under these circumstances, we believe that the “personal 
embarrassment” was incidental to or in aggravation of Section 104(a)(2)182 personal injuries and 
that the entire $ 45,000 payment is, therefore, excludable under Section 104(a)(2). In reaching 
this conclusion, we have found it unnecessary to decide whether damages received in settlement 
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of a claim based solely upon personal embarrassment would be excludable under Section 
104(a)(2).”183 Though not a decision that had a convincing reasoning for its judgment, it 
certainly had the effect of merging the statutory physical injury exclusion and the non-statutory 
nonphysical injury exclusion.184 Later, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roemer v. 
Commissioner185 provided more clarification. In this case, the taxpayer sued a credit company 
for issuing a defamatory report that resulted in his being denied several agency licenses. He was 
awarded compensatory and punitive damages which he sought to exclude under Section 
104(a)(2). The Tax Court held the entire award taxable drawing a distinction between damages 
to personal reputation and damages to business reputation.186  Reversing the Tax Court, the Ninth 
Circuit held that for tax treatment of damages, the relevant distinction should be made between 
personal and nonpersonal injuries, and not between physical and nonphysical injuries.187  In 
1986, the Tax Court reconsidered its holding on damages to professional reputation. In Threlkeld 
v. Commissioner,188 the Tax Court followed the Roemer approach, allowing exclusion of the 
settlement amount allocated to damages to professional reputation.189  The Tax Court expressly 
found no distinction between physical and emotional injuries or between injury to personal 
reputation and injury to professional reputation. The Tax Court held that the proper inquiry has 
to be the “origin and character of the claim,” and not “the consequences of the injury.”190 
According to the court, even if lost income is the best measure of damages, that does not change 
the character of the claim. To characterize the claim in that case, the court focused on the 
                                                 
183 Seay, 58 T.C. at 40. 
184 See Hobbs supra note 167, at 72. 
185 79 T.C. 398, (1982). 
186 Id. at 405. 
187 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983). 
188 87 T.C. 1294 (1986); see also Leandra L. Gassenheimer, The Excludability of Employment Discrimination 
Awards under Code Section 104(a)(2) after Burke v. United States and Commissioner v. Schleier, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
315, 318-319 (1996). 
189 Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1298. 
190 Id. at 1299. 
 29
taxpayer's complaint and found that the cause of action was malicious prosecution, which would 
be classified as a personal injury cause of action under applicable state law. On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopting the Roemer reasoning.191 
 
2. The Justifications of Exclusion 
The most common policy explanations for Section 104(a)(2) are: (1) the return of capital 
theory; (2) the involuntary nature of transaction theory; (3) the compassion or humanitarianism 
theory; (4) the imputed income theory; and (5) the bunching of income theory192 or the 
administrative concerns theory.193 
The return of capital theory is powerful in its simplicity and intuitive logic194 and happens 
to be the most common explanation for the Section 104 exclusion.195  Return of capital is a 
payment received that equals, or does not exceed, a taxpayer's investment or basis in an item. 
Under this approach, damage awards are considered a return of capital. When a taxpayer's mental 
or physical health is injured, a damage award compensates a taxpayer for the injury and, in doing 
so, returns the lost capital. This mirrors a traditional principle in tort law that the purpose of 
compensatory damages is to put the injured party in the position that he or she would have been 
had the party not been injured. Thus, the damages make the injured party whole.196  This theory 
is not without criticism though. In order to have a return of capital, a taxpayer must first have a 
basis or investment in his or her body. However, a taxpayer cannot be said to have a basis in his 
or her body because human bodies are not purchased. Furthermore, a person's basis in his or her 
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body cannot be the cost to maintain that body because a taxpayer deducts those costs in the 
annual personal exemption. Accordingly, the return of capital theory alone cannot adequately 
explain the policy underlying the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion.197  This theory was rejected in 
Horton v. Commissioner198 and thus is no longer very relevant. 
Second is the involuntary transaction theory which simply states that a plaintiff does not 
ask to be injured and thus is not liable for the consequences of injury, including recovery of 
damages.199  Therefore, under this theory, Section 104 is analogous to other sections of the tax 
code that afford special tax treatment to involuntary transactions.200  For example, Section 
1033201 allows a taxpayer to postpone gain after an involuntary conversion of property. Under 
this section, if a taxpayer's property is destroyed, the taxpayer can exclude any gain received 
from insurance, but only if the taxpayer reinvests the money in a replacement property.202 
However, Sections 104 and 1033 are not completely analogous. Even though Section 1033 
allows for a postponement of gain, Section 1033, unlike Section 104, does not create an 
exclusion from income but rather, provides a postponement of income recognition. 
Consequently, this theory is also inadequate for explaining the exclusion under Section 104.203 
The third theory is the compassion or humanitarianism theory. Many believe that the very 
origin of Section 104(a)(2) is congressional compassion and concern for the injured.204  If part of 
a damage award is used for paying tax then the injured taxpayer may not be able to cover the 
entire expenses needed for complete medical care. And this would defeat the primary goal of tort 
                                                 
197 See Stedaman, supra note 192, at 390. 
198 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993), aff’d 33 F.2d 625 (6 th Cir. 1994). 
199 See Stedman, supra note 192, at 390-391. 
200 Id. 
201 26 U.S.C. § 1033. 
202 See Stedman, supra note 192, at id. Section 104(a)(2) is somewhat similar in that Section 213 allows an 
offsetting deduction to the extent of an inclusion of a recovery for personal injury where the injured party suffers 
actual damages for medical treatment that is not reimbursed by an insurance company. 
203 Id. 
204 See Stedman, supra note 192, at 391. 
 31
law which is compensation of victims for personal injuries and look as if the government is 
engaging, by taxing, in a “vulturous behavior”.205  It also leads to greater damage awards in order 
to cover the tax, attorney’s fees and other costs. Thus, under this theory, Section 104(a)(2) is 
comparable to Section 101 of the  Code206 which provide exclusion for amounts received under 
life insurance contracts.207 
A fourth possible explanation is the imputed income theory.208  The concept of imputed 
income is further subdivided into two types. The first type is derived from the use of “household 
durables.” In other words, the owner of a house saves in rent which he or she would have to pay 
to a landlord had he or she been living in a rented house. This saving in rent is considered 
imputed income. The second type is derived by using one’s own labor. A taxpayer grows 
vegetables in his or her garden and the resulting saving is imputed income to the taxpayer. 
However, in both cases, the IRS does not include this amount in gross income.209  The imputed 
income theory may be used to explain the exclusion of damages from gross income. 
A fifth justification is based on the bunching of income theory.210  The gist of this theory 
is that it would be unfair to tax damages because the recovery would artificially place a taxpayer 
in a higher progressive rate bracket. In other words, if a taxpayer would have received a fraction 
of damages each year spread over a long period, this would decrease or even eliminate his or her 
tax liability. But because of lump sum payment, the taxpayer might be paying a considerable 
amount of tax at a much higher rate in the year of receipt.211  However, this theory has been 
criticized because Congress can easily set this problem right by averaging the damage award 
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over the relevant period. This way, the taxpayer would not have to report the entire award as 
income in one particular year.212  Moreover, difficulties with the allocation of awards, for 
example between taxable and exempt income, have also been cited as potential justifications for 
the current system.213  
 
3. The Amendments in  Section 104(a)(2) 
(a) Congress’s 1989 Amendment 
Throughout the period of the judicial and administrative expansion phase of Section 
104(a)(2) marked by Hawkins, Seay, and Roemer, Congress remained silent.214  Then, in 1989, 
the House of Representatives proposed an amendment to Section 104(a)(2), repudiating the 
courts’ expansive reading. The proposed amendment read: “[G]ross income does not include . . . 
the amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness in a case 
involving physical injury or physical sickness . . .” The accompanying committee report 
confirmed the House's recognition that courts were interpreting Section 104(a)(2) too broadly. 
The Report stated that “some courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases 
involving employment discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury 
or sickness,” but that the committee believed this “inappropriate where no physical injury or 
sickness is involved.”215  The conference committee rejected the proposed amendment, however, 
in favor of a substitute amendment which, in effect, gave congressional approval to the extension 
of Section 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries:  “Paragraph [Section 104(a)(2)] shall not apply to 
any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical 
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sickness.” The proposal was signed into law as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1989.216  Unfortunately, the 1989 amendment achieved expansion by contraction.217  Congress 
did not realize that by declaring only punitive damages for nonphysical injuries taxable, it was 
impliedly allowing the exclusion of Section 104(a)(2) to apply to compensatory awards for 
nonphysical injuries. This was not the intention of the House and gave courts the freedom to 
apply Section 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries.218  In 1992, the Supreme Court, in Burke v. 
United State,219 reaffirmed the statutory requirement that for damages to be within the scope of 
Section 104(a)(2), the claim on which the damages were based must be tort or tort-type.220  The 
principal contribution of the Burke decision was to set criteria for determining whether a claim is 
a tort or tort-type.221  Three years later, in Commissioner v. Schlier,222 the Court added another 
requirement to that enunciated by Burke. It was held that the damages must have been received 
on account of personal injuries and sickness.223  
 
(b) The 1996 Amendment 
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Burke and Schilier, the House of 
Representatives proposed to limit the exclusion in Section 104(a)(2) once again.224  However, 
even the amended Code Section 104(a)(2) did not define what “personal injury” or “personal 
sickness” meant.225  For an understanding of these two terms one may look at the House 
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Committee Report that contains an explanation of the requirement of physical injury or physical 
sickness.226  The Committee believed that substantial litigation had resulted in an attempt to 
attribute the reason for the award.227  The Report provided that the exclusion from gross income 
was not intended to apply to any damages received based on a claim of employment 
discrimination or emotional distress. It also noted that since all damages received on account of 
physical injury or physical sickness were allowed to be excluded from gross income, the 
exclusion from gross income applied to any damages received on a claim of emotional distress 
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.228  Moreover, footnote 24 of the Report 
expressed the Committee’s intention that the term “emotional distress” include physical 
symptoms (e.g. insomnia, headaches, stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional 
distress.229  Thus, the Report specifically intended that physical manifestations of emotional 
distress should not be treated as a “physical injury or physical sickness.” In other words, it 
wanted to ensure a proximate physical impact that produced an immediate physical injury or 
sickness (although not necessarily to the plaintiff) in order to have a “physical injury or physical 
sickness” from which excludible damages could flow.230  However, the exclusion from gross 
income specifically applied to the amount of damages received that were not in excess of the 
amount paid for medical care attributable to emotional distress.231  So, if emotional distress 
resulted in physical symptoms for which the injured party sought treatment and incurred 
expenses, the recovery was excludable up to the amount of the expenses. 
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Unlike in 1989, when the Senate had not initially accepted the House version of the bill, 
this time the Conference Committee agreed to the House version.232  The Conference Committee 
report quoted much of the language from the House Report as the reason why the damages 
arising from emotional distress were being excluded.233  The flush language added to Section 
104(a)(2) made it very clear that emotional distress shall not be treated as a “physical injury or 
physical sickness.”234 Thus, the clear purpose of the new “physical injury or physical sickness” 
requirement was to make all amounts received for emotional distress damages, including 
amounts received on account of physical manifestations arising out of that emotional distress, 
includible in income.235 
 
C. The Tort Law Perspective  
Damage recoveries for personal injuries are as old as tort law.236 One of the principal 
functions of tort law is to make the victim whole again through compensatory damages.237  In the 
case of pecuniary damage, the emphasis is on putting the injured party back in the same 
economic position that party would have been in if no loss had occurred.238 Though punitive 
damages are an important part of tort law, the present discussion is confined to compensatory 
damages. In tort law the term “compensatory damages” encompasses recoveries for both 
economic harms (such as medical expenses, lost wages, and earning capacity) and noneconomic 
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harms (such as pain and suffering, and humiliation).239  The fundamental aim of tort law is to 
create disincentives to socially harmful conduct.240  The interconnection between tax law and tort 
law is important since the Burke judgment effectively limited the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion to 
damages received on account of a claim that redresses a tort-like personal injury.241  This was 
contrasted with legal injury of an economic character.242 
As noted earlier, through successive amendments in Section 104(a)(2), its scope has been 
narrowed to a great extent.243  In the present day context, this section provides that only 
recoveries for compensatory damages received as a result of physical injury of physical sickness 
are excludible.244 
 
1. Tort Law Physical Injury and Section 104(a)(2)  
Under Section 104(a)(2), interpretive difficulties exist with regard to the words “physical 
injury or physical sickness.”245  Congress failed to stipulate whether physical contact is required 
or whether physical manifestations of a nonphysical injury would suffice.246  Also, the 
conference report was silent with respect to the presence of physical sickness when the origin of 
the action is a nonphysical injury, i.e., sexual harassment resulting in an ulcer or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress resulting in suicide.247  Since the amended statute provides an 
exclusion for amounts paid for physical injury “or” physical sickness, presumably some portion 
                                                 
239 See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 145 (1992). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Burke, 504 U.S. at 238-239. 
243 See supra text accompanying notes 214-235. 
244 26 U.S.C.  § 104(a)(2). 
245 See Hobbs, supra note 167, at 88. 
246 Id. 
247 See Hobbs, supra note 167, at 89. 
 37
of such awards should be excludable.248  The IRS’s guidance on this issue is limited to a single 
private letter ruling.249 The ruling (sometimes referred to as the “Job from Hell” ruling)250 
describes a “slow progression” of affronts and injuries suffered by the plaintiff on the job.251  As 
per this ruling the plaintiff's relationship with her employer at first had been friendly, but later 
came to include lewd remarks and unwanted attempts to make sexual contact, then progressed to 
unwanted physical touching without “observable bodily harm.” Later, the employer “assaulted” 
the plaintiff, causing “what [she] represent[ed] was extreme pain,” although her doctors found 
nothing “physically wrong” with her. During a subsequent road trip, the employer assaulted her 
again, “cutting her and biting her.” Later assaults resulted in “skin discoloration and swelling.” 
The IRS ruled that the employer's assaults produced physical injury (exempt from taxation when 
compensated by damages) only when they reached the cutting and biting stage. The ruling 
describes the standard for “physical” injury as “uninvited physical contacts resulting in 
observable bodily harm such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding.” While this is a non-
precedent252 position taken by the IRS, it provides a window into the Service's thinking on the 
subject.253  
 
2. The Tort Law Emotional Distress and Section 104(a)(2)  
The statutory language contained in Section 104(a)(2) reasonably produces two very 
different interpretations.254  First, the section might mean that a recovery solely for emotional 
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distress unaccompanied by a physical injury is to be treated as a taxable nonphysical injury 
award, except to the extent of medical costs incurred in treating the emotional distress.255  Under 
this reading, Section 104(a)(2) contains a limited nonphysical injury exclusion for claims of 
emotional distress.256  But the language might instead limit the exclusion for physical injury and 
physical sickness.257  Under this reading, when a claim of physical injury or physical sickness 
includes damages for emotional distress, the only portion of the emotional distress recovery that 
may be excluded is the amount received for medical cost reimbursement.258 
In tort law there is a common law rule that physical injury or physical impact is a 
prerequisite to the recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.259  At 
common law, the physical injury/physical impact rule barred recovery for purely psychological 
injuries.260  A plaintiff could only recover damages for emotional distress which flowed from 
physical injuries caused by a tortfeasor's negligence.261  The common law rule is based on 
judges' skepticism about the reliability of evidence regarding the plaintiff's mental state and the 
possibility that plaintiffs may be faking emotional distress.262  Because it is usually harder to fake 
physical injuries, the physical injury/physical impact requirement was interposed in an attempt to 
avoid the problem of proof of injury.263  It is very possible that Congress may have the same 
concerns that judges have had with respect to emotional distress that is not attributable to 
physical injury or physical sickness.264  Hence, Congress imposed the requirement of physical 
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injury or physical sickness for the personal injury exclusion to apply.265  Furthermore, in its 
conference report, Congress allows tax-free treatment for emotional distress only if the award is 
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.266  This position mirrors the common law 
rule that allows damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the emotional 
distress is attributable to physical injury.267  
 
3. The Tort Law Defamation and Section 104(a)(2) 
It is interesting to note that the common law physical injury/physical impact rule of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress has an exception. Recovery is possible for emotional 
distress attributable to defamation.268 The conference report, however, provided that the 
exclusion does not apply to injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional distress, 
thus departing from the common law tort rule in the case of defamation.269 
 
D. The Employment Law Perspective  
1. Wrongful Discharge  
Damages for wrongful discharge from employment can be recovered under  both tort and 
contract law.270 In Byrne v. Commissioner,271the taxpayer was fired by her employer under the 
suspicion that she had cooperated with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), which was investigating the employer for possible wage disparity.272 The EEOC 
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concluded that the taxpayer’s discharge of Byrne was calculated to discourage other employees 
from cooperating with the EEOC investigation.273 Upon the EEOC’s complaint and resulting 
compromise with the employer, the taxpayer eventually settled for a lump-sum payment in lieu 
of reinstatement and for not suing her employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act.274  The Tax 
Court estimated that the claims settled were tort-like claims to the extent of fifty percent (the 
other fifty percent being attributed to contract claims) and therefore half of the payment was 
treated as taxable.275  The Third Circuit, reversed the Tax Court, holding that the statutory claim 
sought to remedy a statutory violation that was defined as wrongful and thus, the claim was more 
tort-like than contract-like. 276  
If we apply Burke to Byrne, it seems that damage awards based on wrongful discharge 
claims received under the Fair Labor Standards Act should be tax-exempt277 because a wrongful 
discharge claim provides relief through compensatory and punitive damages, and thus redresses 
a tort or tort-like right.278 Also, it may be necessary to separate the damages based on contract 
rights from those based on tort rights.279 Moreover, an employer’s tort liability is fixed if his 
discharge of an at-will employee violates a clear mandate of public policy.280 For instance, in 
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Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc.,281 the issue of employer liability arose under the Hawaii 
Whistleblower’s Protection Act (HWPA).282 The HWPA provides, in relevant parts:  
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or 
privileges of employment because: 
  
(1) The employee . . . reports or is about to report to a public body, verbally or in 
writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or rule adopted pursuant to 
law of this State, a political   subdivision of this State, or the United States, unless 
the employee knows that the report is false[.]283 
 
After reviewing the legislative history of HWPA, the court held that the legislature 
intended to safeguard the general public by giving certain protections to individual 
employees who “blow the whistle” for the public good.284 Thus, wrongful discharge 
actions under similar whistleblower’s protection statues should be deemed tort or tort-like 
under the Burke test.  
 
2. Employment Discrimination   
 Threlkeld v. Commissioner285 became the flag bearer for employment discrimination 
damages cases.286  First, Threlkeld noted that lost income was not the sole “measure” of 
damages, thus disagreeing with the argument that the damages replaced otherwise includable 
income. Second, Threlkeld saw no difference between physical and nonphysical injuries, or 
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between professional and nonprofessional injuries. Third, Threlkeld focused on the “character” 
of the claim, an amorphous test. This enabled courts to decide employment discrimination cases 
in favor of taxpayers, despite the fact that  large components of most employment discrimination 
awards confiscated back pay.287 However, judicial concern about back pay awards continued.288 
In some cases289 where taxpayers had recovered back wages and other damages under a single 
anti-discrimination statute, courts bifurcated the damages into a taxable “contractual” component 
(back pay) and a nontaxable “tortuous” component (often the portion the underlying statute 
termed “liquidated damages”).290   
 Damages from some, but not all, employment discrimination claims may be said to have 
been received on account of personal injury or sickness and thus qualify in their own right for the 
Code Section 104(a)(2) exemption.291 Some of them are discussed briefly.  
 
(a)The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Claims  
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act292 (“ADEA”) prohibits age-based 
discriminatory practices involving hiring, firing, and compensation.293 ADEA is an example of a 
statute offering both back pay and liquidated damages.294 Under this, a victim of willful 
discrimination is entitled to “liquidated damages” in an amount equal to the back pay awarded.295 
                                                 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 See, e.g., Redfield v. Ins Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (addressing a claim based on ADEA); 
Pistillo v. Comm, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (similarly addressing an ADEA claim); Rickel v. Comm, 900 F.2d 
655 (3d Cir. 1990) (also addressing an ADEA claim). 
290 See  Gassenheimer, supra note 188, at 319-320. 
291 See Chun, supra note 270, at 294. 
292 29 U.S.C 623. 
293 See Chun, supra note 270, at 295. 
294 See Gassenheimer supra note 188, at 320. 
295 Id. 
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Rickel v. Commissioner296 was the first ADEA case heard by the Tax Court. Following earlier 
cases involving other anti-discrimination statutes, the Tax Court distinguished between the two 
types of damages awarded and held only the wage-related damages taxable. The court found that 
liquidated damages were excludable from income under Section 104(a)(2) as damages received 
for personal injuries. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, allowing exclusion of all of the 
damages on the theory that the nature of an age discrimination claim is personal injury.297 In 
Downey v. Commissioner298 an airline pilot sued his employer for wrongful discharge and 
violations of ADEA. The Tax Court held that the entire settlement payment was excluded under 
Secition 104(a)(2).299 While holding so, the court overruled its own conclusion in Rickel that that 
back pay or nonliquidated damages based on back pay received on account of claim under the 
ADEA are not excludable under Section 104(a)(2)300 and stated that: 
[The] petitioner's claim . . . arose not because [the employer] allegedly breached 
some contractual obligation to petitioner but because [the employer] allegedly 
breached its duty under the ADEA not to discriminate on the basis of age. [The 
employer's] duty under the ADEA not to discriminate does not depend on a 
contractual relationship with petitioner. . .301 
 
Thus, the ADEA compensation scheme evidences a tort-like conception of injury remedy.302 
 
(b)  Title VII Claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964  
In Burke, the United States Supreme Court ruled that sexual discrimination claims 
brought under pre-1991 Title VII303 were not tort or tort-like claims.304 Since the remedies for 
                                                 
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
298 97 T.C. 150 (1991). 
299 Id. at 173. 
300 Id. 
301 Id; see also Chun, supra note 270, at 296. 
302 See Chun, supra note 270, at 287 citing the supplemental opinion in Downey v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 634, 635 
(1993). 
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pre-1991 Title VII claims were limited to back pay awards and injunctive relief, the claims were 
deemed not to redress tort or tort-type rights. Therefore, the settlement payments awarded to the 
claimants were not excludible from gross income. Decisions following the Burke opinion also 
ruled that pre-amendment Title VII claims are not qualified tort or tort-like claims for the Section 
104(a)(2) exclusion.305 Burke can be viewed as a limitation on the favorable tax treatment of 
Title VII actions. However, certain post-amendment Title VII claims will most likely qualify as 
tort or tort-like claims.  
 
(c) Equal Pay Act Claims  
The Equal Pay Act306 (EPA) amended the Fair Labor Standards Act and outlaws 
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex. Damages available under the EPA include back wages 
and liquidated damages.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined 
that these liquidated damages were intended to compensate for nonpecuniary harms such as pain 
and suffering and for pecuniary losses that are too difficult to measure.307 In Thompson v. 
Commissioner,308 the taxpayer was an employee in the government printing press, and she 
brought a claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII and the EPA.309 The Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court, ruling that while liquidated 
damages were excluded from gross income, an award of back pay under the EPA would not 
qualify for the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion. The court distinguished an award received as 
                                                                                                                                                             
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 See, e.g., Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993); Hubbard v. Administrator, 
Envtl. Protection Agency, 982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
306 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 
206(d)(3) (1988)). 
307 Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
308 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
309 Id. at 710. 
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compensation for services rendered from compensation for the inability to earn an income due to 
the tortious action of a defendant.  The court said:  
The back pay award was simply recovery for earned, but unpaid, wages which 
distinguishes her award of back pay from awards for lost wages or lost income in 
traditional personal injury/tort actions. [Thompson] received compensation for 
services rendered whereas a tort plaintiff receives compensation for the inability 
to earn an income due to the tortious action of a defendant.310 
 
However, the Tax Court later rejected similar reasoning when it analyzed the ADEA claim in 
Downey.  Downey concluded that the ADEA created a statutory duty on the employer to not 
discriminate based upon age. The court recognized that the EPA creates a similar statutory duty 
involving sex discrimination. Therefore, the Tax Court is likely to rule that back pay awards 
under the EPA are excluded from taxable income. If the EPA claims for back pay are deemed 
similar to the ADEA claims and conclusions of the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit in 
Thompson are rejected, the entire award from an EPA claim will be excluded from gross income. 
The Fourth Circuit concluded in Thompson that liquidated damages serve as a deterrent to ensure 
compliance with the Act and as compensation for injuries too obscure or difficult to prove. 
Applying the Burke test, damage awards under EPA claims will be excluded from taxable 
income due to their punitive and compensatory functions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
310 Id. at 712. 
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CHAPTER 4  
A Critique of Pre-hearing Murphy Decision 
 
 Shortly after it was delivered, the Murphy decision came under sharp criticism due to 
court’s inability to see issues in a proper frame of reference. 
The court first considered the applicability of Section 104(a)(2) and decided that Section 
104(a)(2) was inapplicable since Ms. Murphy’s damages were not awarded by reason of, or 
because of, physical personal injury. However, for its reasoning, the court’s reliance on the 1922 
IRS opinion311 was not proper as this was issued in the light of Stratton’s Independence v. 
Howbert312 and Macomber. The opinion made sense in the light of both cases since they took a 
limited approach to the definition of income.313 In view of the expanded definition of income as 
given by Glenshaw Glass, the applicability of such an opinion is highly doubtful. After this, the 
court questioned the constitutionality of Section 104(a)(2). Ideally, the court should have 
explored the Code to see if the damages could be included under some other provision, notably 
Section 61. Section 104(a)(2) does not trigger a tax liability.314Instead Section 61 requires that 
amounts not specifically excluded by other provisions of the Code should be included in the 
income of a taxpayer.315 Even if Section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional, it does not mean that the 
damages which Ms. Murphy received could not be included in her income.316 Thus, the D.C. 
                                                 
311 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 91; see supra note 38. 
312 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913). 
313 See Kalinka, supra note 32, at 9. 
314 Id. at 10. 
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Circuit should have held that Section 61, as applicable to the damages in question, and as 
amended in 1996 was unconstitutional.317 
The court’s constitutional law analysis was not flawless either. The court was mistaken 
when it believed that the Sixteenth Amendment constitutes the sole source of Congress’s taxing 
power. Congress’s taxing power instead comes form Article I of the Constitution. Also, the court 
erred by not properly considering the expanded definition of income as propounded by the 
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
317 Id; see also Germain supra note 89, at 75. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Conclusions 
 
 Upon close scrutiny, one might say that the D.C. Circuit should not have reached the 
constitutional question when initially deciding the Murphy case (Murphy I). If Section 104(a)(2) 
appeared constitutionally problematic, Section 61 and Glenshaw Glass should have provided 
some clues about the problem faced by the court. Even if Section 104(a)(2) failed to provide the 
justification to extend an exclusion to Ms. Murphy’s award, it did not follow that Section 61 also 
failed. By disbodying Section 61 from its constitutional framework, the D.C. Circuit fell short of 
declaring it unconstitutional. If an item of income should fall  within the ambit of Section 61, a 
decision otherwise would undermine the principles of the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus, it was in 
this vein that the D.C. Circuit decided to rehear the case. From a statutory and a constitutional 
perspective, the D.C. Circuit’s judgment in Murphy II is better reasoned. 
 Applying Glenshaw Glass principles, the award received by Ms. Murphy appears to be 
income, particularly since there is practically no restriction on Congress’s power to tax. The only 
sticking point to this proposition is the human capital theory, but that is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it is administratively impractical to measure human capital. Insurmountable 
difficulties quickly arise in attempting to do so. If a taxpayer has human capital investment in his 
or her own body, the day may not be far behind when a depreciation allowance will be sought on 
this capital asset.  Second, how does one determine that Ms. Murphy had a return of capital when 
she had no capital investment in the first place?  For example, can it be said that she extended a 
 49
loan of human capital to her employer when she started to work? Advancing the human capital 
theory may not take one very far since Congress can always trump the theory, because direct 
taxes, by their definition and explanation, have never included taxes on human capital. 
The issue then becomes political. Does Congress want this exclusion to extend to 
damages received on account of emotional distress? If it does, it can. Not all taxes are justifiable 
and not all of them are based on solid logic or perfect reasoning. Taxing is a blunt function of 
government and to expect sophistication or perfectly rational and scientific theories to support it 
would be a fallacy.  Having said this, Congress has much leeway to address the issue decisively, 
in a victim-friendly manner, especially under the whistle-blower statutes. Congress has the 
legitimate power to tax recoveries received on account of emotional distress, but it needs to find 
the fine balance between that power and the responsibility that comes with it. The issue is one of 
policy, and Congress should take policy considerations of this type into account.318  Murphy II 
might rightly be seen as a corrective course of action undertaken by the D.C. Circuit in the wake 
of wide ranging criticism of Murphy I. This will, however, not undermine the importance of 
Murphy I in showing to Congress the policy concerns on the basis of which any changes in law 
might be desirable. Courts may not be the right kind of forums to address this concern but 
Congress certainly is. Thus, the issue would be removed from the “docket” to the “ballot box,” 
and the issue would be decided once and for all. 
 
 
 
                                                 
318 See Debrah Cohen-Whelan, From Injury to Income: The Taxation of Punitive Damages "on Account of" United 
States v. Schleier, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 941(1996). 
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